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Abstract: An evaluation can be conducted in-house or can be outsourced 
to an external party. Yet organizations do not always have full 
discretion to decide on the locus for evaluation implementation. 
Certain attributes often push the organization in one direction 
or another. Via a systematic pairwise comparison of attributes of 
18 organizations in the Flemish (Belgian) public sector, we were 
able to indicate the conditions that matter most in determining 
the locus of policy evaluation implementation. Our findings can 
thus enrich existing guidelines on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of internal and external evaluations.
Résumé : Une évaluation peut être conduite en interne ou être sous-traitée 
à un partenaire extérieur. Une organisation n’aura pas toujours 
l’entière latitude pour décider du lieu de l’implémentation de 
l’évaluation. En effet, certains attributs vont souvent orienter 
l’organisation dans l’une ou l’autre direction. Grâce à une com-
paraison systématique deux-à-deux des attributs de dix-huit 
organisations du service public belge flamand, nous sommes en 
mesure d’indiquer les conditions les plus déterminantes pour 
le lieu de l’évaluation des politiques publiques. Nos résultats 
peuvent enrichir les directives existantes sur les arguments en 
faveur ou en défaveur des évaluations externes.
INTRODUCTION
In principle, with every decision to evaluate, an organi-
zation should make the choice whether it will ask staff members to 
conduct the evaluation or whether it will hire someone from outside 
the organization for this task. When listing the criteria that deter-
mine the choice for a particular locus, the following considerations 
usually appear in the literature: cost, knowledge, flexibility, objectiv-
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ity, accountability, willingness to criticize, ethics, and utilization of 
results (Conley-Tyler, 2005). Typically, the advantages of an in-house 
evaluation are the symmetrical inverse of the disadvantages of an 
external evaluation, and vice versa (Sonnichsen, 2000, p. 64). De-
pending on the weight given to each of the relevant considerations, 
organizations might choose one or the other approach to what we call 
the “locus” of evaluation.
Much of the evaluation literature appears to have been written on 
the assumption that organizations can choose a different strategy for 
each evaluand. Yet, in practice, many organizations are often biased 
toward one or the other approach, irrespective of the specific evalu-
and at stake. The freedom of choice for internal or external evalua-
tion is relative, and is heavily influenced by the framing conditions 
in which an organization operates. Despite the increased attention 
to context in the evaluation field (Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Sonnichsen, 
1994, 2000), there is still a knowledge gap about the conditions that 
explain why some organizations mainly choose in-house evaluations 
or dominantly opt for ex-house evaluations. As not all organizations 
follow the general trend toward more internal evaluations (Ma-
thison, 2011), we are challenged to answer the following question: 
Which organizational contextual factors are more decisive than oth-
ers in explaining variations in the locus of evaluation?
This article seeks to answer this question, based on the analysis of 18 
organizations of the Flemish (Belgian) public sector. After outlining 
the relevance of this study, we offer background on the Flemish cases, 
and discuss the conditions included in the analysis. A subsequent 
section presents the Most Similar Different Outcome/Most Different 
Similar Outcome (MSDO/MDSO) technique: an innovative method 
that helped us to identify the conditions that can best explain why 
some organizations have a tendency for internal evaluations and 
others usually rely on external evaluations. We conclude the article 
with a discussion of our findings.
RELEVANCE
Internal evaluation has been on a steady increase (Mathison, 2011), 
to the extent that it has now developed into a genuine subfield of 
evaluation: Internal evaluation is “a key way for organizations to set 
their own directions, foster change, and know if they were achieving 
results” (Volkov, 2011, p. 6). Wildavsky’s seminal piece on the “self-
evaluating organization” (1972) can be considered a major reference 
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in this subfield. While a strong case for internal evaluation is often 
made, most scholars now agree, however, that the choice should be 
made with respect to the purpose and especially to the primary users 
of the study (Sonnichsen, 2000; Vedung, 2009; Volkov, 2011). Vedung 
(2009) makes a distinction between the purposes of accountability, 
improvement, and basic knowledge. First, when the purpose is ac-
countability to external stakeholders, it seems best that evaluations 
be externally conducted. External evaluators are usually seen as 
more objective than internal evaluators (Conley-Tyler, 2005). Inter-
nal evaluators might find their objectivity compromised by the poli-
cies and politics of the organization and its underlying value system. 
On the downside, however, external evaluators run the risk of losing 
the confidence of people in the agency, when they appear to be too 
critical. Moreover, the fact that they are often seeking new contracts 
can make them vulnerable to direct conflicts of interest (Vedung, 
2009, p. 118; Worthen et al., 1997, p. 18). It also happens that exter-
nal evaluations are commissioned for mere symbolic or strategic ac-
countability purposes: to justify pre-existing organizational decisions 
or to provide “appearances more flattering than reality” (Vedung, 
2009, p. 111).
Second, when the goal is program amelioration and refinement, eval-
uations are preferably conducted by in-house staff (Vedung, 2009, p. 
119). Internal evaluators can better formulate the evaluation find-
ings in the language of their organization, and thus enhance the 
chance of utilization of evaluation findings. It can be argued that “[i]
t is difficult for an external evaluator to ever learn as much about the 
program as the insider knows” (Worthen et al., 1997, p. 18). However, 
external evaluators may also have the ability to communicate rele-
vant information, on condition that they work closely with stakehold-
ers in a participative mode (Conley-Tyler, 2005; Fetterman, 2001).
Third, basic knowledge evaluations refer to the type of “fundamental 
research that seeks to increase the general understanding of reality” 
(Vedung, 2009, p. 110). Meta-evaluations are a classic example. The 
primary audiences of this type of evaluation are not particular agen-
cies, but rather government operators, the evaluation community, or 
academia. Therefore, basic knowledge evaluations might suitably be 
conducted by an external party, such as research institutes or uni-
versities. But it can be equally useful for the general culture of an 
agency to conduct a synthesizing meta-evaluation in-house (Vedung, 
2009, p. 120).
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Although we only touched upon some of the most apparent advan-
tages and disadvantages of internal or external evaluation (for a more 
extensive list, see, e.g., Sonnichsen, 2000, p. 64), it is apparent that the 
evaluation literature is not always conclusive about the best locus for 
each evaluation purpose. Besides, it is clear that the literature pri-
marily focuses on individual evaluation studies. The organizational 
context, which transcends individual evaluation studies, often re-
mains out of the picture. Yet we can assume that this context strongly 
determines the organizational inclination toward one locus or the 
other. As Dahler-Larsen (2012, p. 36) argues, “as evaluation becomes 
an organizational functional entity, it is subject to the structures, val-
ues and rules of the organization.” Especially in times where internal 
evaluation is on the increase, it is relevant to understand (a) which 
conditions facilitate organizations to comply with this trend, and (b) 
which conditions explain why an organization is still outsourcing 
most of its evaluations. Unlike Wildavsky (1972, p. 509), who focused 
on preconditions “depressing or facilitating evaluation,” we systemati-
cally compare organizations that are all active in evaluation, but with 
varying biases in locus. We focus not on the ideal, and do not consider 
whether evaluations indeed get “high impact” (Sonnichsen, 2000).
The demarcation line between internal and external evaluations can 
be an issue of discussion. Scriven (1980, quoted in Mathison, 1991, p. 
159) has emphasized that “internal/external is really a difference of 
degree rather than kind.” In the present study, we consider the stage of 
“conclusion formulation” as the demarcation point. When the conclu-
sions are formulated by an external party (e.g., consultant or univer-
sity), we label this evaluation as “external.” When these conclusions 
are instead formulated by the organization itself, the evaluation is 
considered “internal” (see also Vedung, 2009). With evaluations, we re-
fer to Scriven’s (1980) conceptualization by defining them as “scientific 
analyses of a certain policy (or part of a policy), aimed at determining 
the merit or worth of the evaluand on the basis of certain criteria.” The 
definition of evaluations studied in this article is more restrictive than 
the encompassing conceptualizations applied in many of the works on 
internal evaluation (e.g., Sonnichsen, 2000). Performance measure-
ments, for example, fall outside the scope of our analysis.
THE FLEMISH PUBLIC SECTOR AS OUR DOMAIN OF 
INVESTIGATION
Evaluation practice has spread rather slowly and unevenly among Eu-
ropean countries (Furubo, Rist, & Sandahl, 2002). Belgium is usually 
47La Revue canadienne d’évaLuation de pRogRamme
situated in a second wave of countries that have adopted evaluation 
practice, mainly following external pressures. In Belgium the mo-
mentum for increased attention to policy evaluation only came when 
the second wave was already slowing down. Our article will focus on 
Flanders, to date a largely undiscovered evaluation area. Unlike in a 
few pioneer countries or regions, evaluation was not introduced here 
as an autonomous tool, but as part of a broader package of reform. In 
2006, the Flemish administration implemented a government-wide 
reform package called “Better Administrative Policy” (BAP), which 
was modelled along the New Public Management (NPM) blueprint. Al-
though policy evaluation was not a core principle of the reforms, it has 
indirectly been given important attention. Departments have been 
explicitly assigned the policy evaluation function, and autonomized 
agencies are supposed to generate input by means of relevant policy 
and managerial information for policy evaluation (VlaamsParlement, 
2003). The fact that the reforms incorporate substantial NPM-inspired 
elements makes it a very interesting case. Generally, as described by 
Mathison (2011), NPM has served as an important catalyst for the 
promotion of internal evaluation. Several years after the implemen-
tation of the reforms, policy evaluation practice is now practiced by a 
large variety of public sector organizations in Flanders, across a large 
variety of policy fields. The present research is based on a study of 
18 of these organizations. They represent the different policy fields 
in which Flanders is active: education; mobility; environment; en-
ergy; housing; agriculture; work and social economics; welfare, public 
health, and family; culture and youth; and economics. Of the cases we 
investigated, 11 mainly conduct their evaluations in-house. The other 
7 cases are more inclined to outsource their evaluations.
EXPLANATORY CONDITIONS
Our study being the first of its kind, at least to our knowledge, we 
consider it most reliable to proceed with an open, inductive approach, 
and not to exclude any potentially interesting conditions beforehand. 
To this goal, we applied a mixed strategy of evaluation literature 
screening and semistructured interviews with representatives from 
our particular administrative area. We continued our search for 
variables until we reached a point of saturation, in which no new 
variables were encountered. The choice for a single area of analysis 
enabled us to control for a large number of conditions.
We distinguish between five categories of conditions, inspired by 
actor-centred neo-institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997). Two of them are 
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actor related. The other three categories are of a more structural na-
ture. In the actor-related categories, we make a distinction between 
capabilities of the organization and actor orientations vis-à-vis eval-
uation. From a more structural perspective, we distinguish between 
conditions relating to the institutional setting, conditions concerning 
policy issue characteristics, and conditions concerning the path of the 
organization. Appendix 1 (first column) lists the 26 conditions of the 
five categories with potential explanatory relevance.
A SYSTEMATIC PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONS
Our search for interesting explanatory conditions resulted in a long 
list of factors. The challenge was then to identify those conditions 
that have most explanatory strength. We chose to rely on the Most 
Similar Different Outcome/Most Different Similar Outcome (MSDO/
MDSO) technique. This method was originally developed by G. De 
Meur as a systematic comparative tool to reduce the complexity of a 
large data set (see, e.g., De Meur, 1996; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 
1994). The technique has proven to be especially useful to get out 
of the usual “small n–many variables dilemma” (De Meur & Berg-
Schlosser, 1994). It helped us to keep the overview of our 18 cases: a 
number too small for the application of most statistical techniques, 
but too big for in-depth, case-oriented analysis. Despite its poten-
tials, MSDO/MDSO has only been applied in a limited way to date. 
The technique basically involves a rigorous and systematic applica-
tion of the assumptions of J. S. Mill (1973), which underpin most 
comparative research designs in the social sciences. Rather than 
focusing on similar and different cases that differ or share only one 
condition, MSDO/MDSO takes a more realistic approach. Its major 
focus goes to most similar and most different cases (De Meur, 1996; 
De Meur & Gottcheiner, 2009). The underlying idea is that the most 
“extreme” pairs of cases, in terms of degree of (dis)similarity, embody 
the strongest explanatory potential. Key objectives are to identify the 
factors that can explain why two very different organizations share 
the same evaluation locus or vice versa: why organizations that share 
many attributes differ in evaluation locus. Phrasing it differently: 
when two organizations share hardly any of the conditions of our 
list but both are outsourcing their evaluations, we can only under-
stand this similar evaluation behaviour by focusing on their limited 
similarities. And inversely: when two organizations share almost 
all conditions but differ in evaluation locus, we can only understand 
this variety by concentrating on the few conditions on which they 
differ. To decide which pairs are most similar or most different, the 
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technique requires the translation of all organizational attributes 
(conditions) into binary codes (values: 0 or 1). Dichotomization delib-
erately simplifies social reality, to keep the focus on large trends and 
general patterns (De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1996; De Meur, Rihoux, 
& Yamasaki, 2009). The main source for the coding of our conditions 
was a survey with closed questions, sent to the management of our 
organizations. The survey was only sent to civil servants that had 
already been interviewed in a prior stage. It was assumed that the 
interview helped both parties (respondents and interviewer) to un-
derstand each other’s interpretation of core evaluation concepts. The 
actual content of the survey mainly overlapped with the interviews’ 
content, but enabled the collection of more structured answers. Ap-
pendix 1 (second column) details what the closed answers of the 
survey questions looked like. The closed answers made comparisons 
across organizations more reliable. Interviews with advisers of the 
ministerial cabinet were conducted to double-check the data with 
what was received from the organizations themselves. In addition, 
data were supplemented with document analysis, so we could verify 
whether reported evaluation studies really fell within this study’s 
scope of analysis. We take the perceptions of respondents as “prox-
ies” for the actual reality. Via the triangulation of different kinds of 
sources and different types of respondents, we nonetheless received 
a robust and reliable picture of each organization. The binary coding 
of the data proved helpful to compensate for the slight differences in 
subjective assessment between and within organizations. We noticed 
that respondents sometimes use different nuances throughout time 
to assess the same situation, but are consistent in the general pat-
tern. For instance, no matter whether respondents considered the 
availability of monitoring information as rather sufficient or fully 
sufficient, we coded this condition as “1.” Appendix 1 lists the thresh-
olds used for the binary coding. Appendix 2 provides the overview of 
codes for our organizations.
With our data dichotomized, we proceeded to the identification of 
pairs that are most similar or most different by simply calculating 
the number of dichotomous conditions for which cases differ. This 
calculation is done per category of conditions, since cases can be 
similar in one category (e.g., actor capabilities) but dissimilar for 
another (e.g., policy issue characteristics). Compare, for instance, 
organizations INTA2 and DEPT7 in Appendix 2. They respectively 
differ in 2, 4, 2, 0, and 1 conditions for categories A to E. To come to 
a comprehensive judgement on (dis)similarity, three analyses were 
conducted in parallel and compared with each other: (a) a pairwise 
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comparison of all cases that dominantly conduct in-house evalu-
ations (grey zone in Appendix 2); (b) a pairwise comparison of all 
cases that mainly outsource their evaluations (white zone); and (c) 
a pairwise comparison of cases that result in different values on the 
locus of evaluation (grey zone versus white zone). Within each of 
the zones, we identified those pair(s) of cases that were most (dis)
similar for the highest number of categories. DEPT1 and DEPT2, 
for instance, can be considered among the most dissimilar pairs of 
the white zone, as they strongly differ in three categories (conditions 
relating to the path of the organization, issue characteristics, and 
actor orientations). Both outsource their evaluations.
Once the most (dis)similar pairs were identified, we looked for the 
conditions that have most explanatory value. For most different 
pairs with the same evaluation locus, we were especially interested 
in the conditions for which they have the same value. The highly dis-
similar cases DEPT1 and DEPT2, for instance, share the perception 
of outcomes that are hard to measure, strong managerial demand 
for evaluations, and high demand of civil society organizations for 
evaluations. These conditions can thus be considered to have strong 
explanatory potential. Inversely, for most similar pairs of cases with 
different evaluation loci, we were interested in the conditions on 
which they differ. Organizations EXTA2 and INTALP2 are among 
the most similar pairs of cases. They share almost all characteristics 
for the category relating to the institutional setting of the organiza-
tion. They have a different value only for the anchorage of an evalu-
ation function. This condition thus seems to be more relevant than 
the others. Following Bursens (1999), we only kept the conditions 
that were mentioned at least twice across several (dis)similar pairs 
of cases. For more technical details on the procedure, we refer the 
reader to more specialized works (De Meur, 1996; De Meur & Berg-
Schlosser, 1996; De Meur & Gottcheiner, 2009).1
WHICH INDIVIDUAL CONDITIONS HAVE MOST EXPLANATORY 
POTENTIAL?
Table 1 lists the conditions that were identified as most explanatory 
powerful.2
The various categories of actor-centred neo-institutionalism all turn 
out to be relevant. Yet, in our Flemish setting, structural conditions 
appear generally more explanatory than conditions of an actor-relat-
ed nature. Starting with the actor-related factors, it is evident that 
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outsourcing evaluations will be facilitated when an organization can 
rely on available external human capital. In our interviews this ele-
ment was repeatedly named as the condition that often jeopardizes 
the successful implementation of planned evaluations. In contrast to 
that of many other countries, the pool of available evaluators in Flan-
ders is very limited. True, variation exists between policy fields. But 
the calls for evaluations often need to be re-issued, in the absence of 
any qualified response. The fact that the Flemish evaluation market 
is very small not only has repercussions for the extent of outsourc-
ing evaluations but also has important consequences in many other 
respects. As only a limited number of applicants usually respond 
to evaluation calls, inevitably the same evaluators are repeatedly 
evaluating the same policies time and again. Similarly, a handful of 
private evaluation firms can easily build competitive advantages in a 
limited market. Methodologically, the pool of techniques used is also 
restricted. Furthermore, peer reviews are hard to implement, as eve-
rybody knows one another. Finally, and importantly, the restriction of 
a small domestic evaluation market in Belgium can cast doubt on the 
traditional argument that external evaluations are more independ-
Table 1
Overview of Most Relevant Conditions
Conditions with most explanatory potential for cases with a tendency to outsource evaluations (+ category)
Availability of external evaluators A
Evaluation demand from civil society organizations B
No/limited evaluation demand from sector minister B
Anchored evaluation unit C
Outcomes that are hard to measure D
No evaluation experience before the NPM reforms E
Organizational stability E
Conditions with most explanatory potential for cases with a tendency for in-house evaluations (+ category)
Evaluation demand from sector minister B
Absent/limited legislative evaluation requirements C
Absent/limited competition D
Outcomes that are easy to measure D
Outputs that are easy to measure D
Evaluation experience before the NPM reforms E
Weak organizational stability E
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ent and objective than evaluations conducted by organization em-
ployees. Such a small market makes commissioners and evaluators 
inevitably mutually dependent (Brans, Pattyn, & De Peuter, 2011).
Evaluation demand of civil society organizations is another impor-
tant element. As claimed by several respondents, civil society organi-
zations often insist on having an evaluation conducted by an external 
party, rather than by the administration itself. Although perhaps not 
always correct, the general image that external evaluators are more 
independent and objective compared with in-house evaluators is a 
major argument in this respect. A civil servant put it this way: “[T]he 
administrator-general is very formal in this regard. He always says: 
even if we can conduct the evaluation itself, if externals do it, it will 
be accepted, and it is objective … and much better … He formulates 
it in a cynical way. But he realizes that if we conduct the evaluation 
in-house, people will be much more critical about the objectivity of 
the results” (interview with DEPT8, our translation). The name on 
the report is often key to lending credibility to an evaluation.
The MSDO/MDSO analysis further hints at the explanatory power 
of ministerial demand for evaluations. The organizations confronted 
with evaluation requests from the minister tend to conduct more in-
house evaluations than those where these requests are not present. 
Explaining this tendency is not obvious. We can speculate that a 
minister prefers to keep evaluations within the circle of the adminis-
tration to better control the findings, although we admit that the per-
sonality and background of the minister in charge can also have some 
influence in this regard. Although this requires further research, it is 
revealing to observe that the department (DEPT8) subjected to the 
minister with the strongest scientific background dominantly relies 
on external expertise.
As to the conditions relating to the institutional setting, the anchor-
age of the evaluation function seems powerful. On one hand, many of 
the organizations with a tendency to outsource evaluations have staff 
at their disposal who are charged with the follow-up of the evalu-
ations and/or who arrange steering committee or working group 
meetings. On the other hand, some organizations also indicate that 
their evaluation unit enables them to conduct internal evaluations. 
Yet, while potentially functional for in- and ex-house evaluations, 
the anchorage of an evaluation function has more explanatory power 
for the cases with a bias to external evaluations. The follow-up of an 
external evaluation, and also the assessment of the offers received 
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from external evaluators, requires the appropriate steering of the 
organization. This is facilitated when an organization has staff at its 
disposal for whom evaluation is one of the core tasks. With the excep-
tion of the organizations that did not conduct evaluations before the 
NPM reforms, all cases that dominantly outsource their evaluations 
have an institutionalized evaluation unit.
Focusing on policy issue characteristics, the organizations that usu-
ally outsource their evaluations are overall more characterized by 
outcomes that are hard to measure. Importantly, all but one of the 
organizations to which this applies are departments. These indeed 
have been formally entrusted with the evaluation task since the 
NPM reforms took place. Tasks of policy preparation and evaluation 
are admittedly more difficult to measure than policy interventions. 
In such a situation, input from an external party is desirable to suc-
cessfully complete the evaluation.
As for the “historical track” of the organization, the length of evalu-
ation experience matters. Not surprisingly, organizations will need 
some time before taking up a large share of in-house evaluations. This 
finding is relevant in light of the importance attributed to the intro-
duction of the NPM philosophy in the public sector for the increase 
in internal evaluations (Mathison, 2011). In Flanders, the organiza-
tions that became engaged in evaluation only after the NPM-oriented 
reforms predominantly outsource their evaluation.
Organizational stability, in turn, is also a key distinguishing fac-
tor. In times of severe reshufflings, organizations seem to be more 
inclined to conduct their evaluations in-house. This is an interesting 
observation, especially when we take into account that evaluation re-
quires change (Wildavsky, 1972). Kiesling (2000, p. 130) argued that 
evaluations involving double-loop learning are usually conducted 
by external evaluators. Double-loop learning can concern a painful 
questioning of an organization’s policies and value. We can speculate 
that stable organizations are more ready to consider the kind of dou-
ble-loop changes suggested by an external party. Another reason for 
our observation is presumably related to the scale of the evaluations 
that are usually outsourced. Because outsourcing is mainly reserved 
for large-scale evaluands, “solid” organizations will be better posi-
tioned to implement these. The involvement of an external evaluator 
is usually more expensive than conducting an internal evaluation.
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Notice that the availability of an adequate evaluation budget does 
not have the most explanatory strength. Also, the organizations with 
a bias toward external evaluations often mention struggling to get 
the funds necessary for an evaluation. Organizational size, measured 
in terms of staff and budget, will be comparably more important. As 
we can derive from our data table, the conduct of dominantly ex-
ternal evaluations remains a privilege of the largest organizations. 
Organizations in charge of large budgets usually have more spare 
resources at their disposal, which allow them to afford more expen-
sive evaluations (Carpenter, 2001). But while shared by the cases 
that dominantly outsource evaluations, organizational size is not a 
key explanatory factor.
The MSDO/MDSO analysis yields a largely, but not entirely, inverse 
picture for the cases with a tendency for internal evaluations. A fac-
tor characterizing the cases with a tendency for in-house evaluation 
practice is the absence of legislative evaluation requirements. Indeed, 
where evaluation clauses exist, the lawmaker often stipulates that 
the study should be conducted by an external party.
Next comes the absence of competition as a powerful discriminatory 
condition. Although our empirical evidence is scarce, we can speculate 
that in case of competition, the need for perceived objectivity will be 
more pertinent than in the case of noncompetition. An external party 
can provide the necessary ammunition to justify the organization’s ex-
istence. Conley-Tyler (2005) also seems to suggest this in her checklist 
for deciding between internal and external evaluations. For “sensitive 
evaluations” (p. 9), she advises proceeding with external evaluators.
Note, finally, that the presence of the skills to conduct internal 
evaluations is an obvious requirement for the conduct of in-house 
evaluations. An organization may be keen on conducting internal 
evaluations, but if it is lacking the skills to do so, it will be more likely 
to turn to an external party. All cases with a tendency for in-house 
evaluations share this characteristic. But this condition does not be-
long to the most critical explanatory factors to distinguish between 
the different outcomes.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
An evaluation can be conducted in-house or can be outsourced to an 
external party. To date, the evaluation literature is not conclusive 
as to the best strategy to follow. It should be clear, however, that an 
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organization will not always have full discretion to decide on the 
locus for evaluation implementation. No matter the extent of belief 
of organizations in self-evaluation (cf. Wildavsky, 1972), and irres-
pective of the purpose and ultimate users of the study (Sonnichsen, 
2000; Vedung, 2009; Volkov, 2011), certain attributes often “push” the 
organization in one or another direction. Via a systematic pairwise 
comparison of attributes of 18 organizations of the Flemish public 
sector, we were able to indicate the conditions that seem to matter 
most in determining the locus of policy evaluation implementation. 
We investigated conditions that are actor-related, but also conditions 
that are of a more structural nature. Within the scope of this article, 
we were not able to unravel their respective weight, but overall, the 
structural conditions were more frequently indicated as relevant 
than the actor-related ones.
These findings are enlightening not only for theoretical purposes. 
They can also inspire practice and complement existing checklists 
for choosing between internal and external evaluations (see, e.g., 
Conley-Tyler, 2005). We should like to emphasize the role of five 
conditions that appear decisive to explain organizations’ bias to one 
or the other locus.
1. Organizational stability matters. An unstable setting dis-
courages organizations from engaging in large-scale exter-
nal evaluation, which can involve double-loop learning.
2. We noticed that the organizations without a pre-reform 
evaluation track all rely mainly on external evaluators. We 
can speculate that these organizations might shift to in-
house evaluations with the gradual development of internal 
knowledge.
3. Competition, or at least the perception of competition with 
other organizations, turns out to be important. Organiza-
tions that operate in a competitive environment seem to feel 
more comfortable with external evaluators. Although not 
always objectively true, external evaluators are considered 
to have a more objective view than in-house staff members. 
The results can back up the commissioning organization’s 
legitimacy.
4. The measurability of organizational outputs and outcomes 
matters. Where outputs and outcomes are difficult to ob-
serve, expertise of outsiders is called in more readily.
5. The presence of an evaluation unit is another valuable 
resource. Although an evaluation unit can be helpful for 
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the execution of both internal and external evaluations, it 
seems a vital advantage especially for the latter. After all, 
the outsourcing of evaluations does not imply a complete 
abandonment of responsibilities in the evaluation. Should 
the external evaluation meet the expectations, it requires 
appropriate steering and follow-up. An evaluation unit can 
in this regard carry out a useful brokerage role.
We do not defend a particular evaluation locus in favour of another. 
As Mathison (2011, p. 19) has stated: “[A]sking whether one or the 
other is better is not a question that can be answered generically.” 
This is not to say that both stances are completely neutral. In the 
introduction, we explicitly underlined the possible impact of the 
evaluation locus on the quality of evaluation findings and their use. 
Particularly in an evaluation setting where the pool of evaluators is 
very limited, the question can be raised whether it is desirable that 
an organization fully relies on external evaluators. From a sustain-
ability perspective, we can argue that organizations should ideally be 
able to conduct a minimum of the evaluations themselves. This would 
be in line with Wildavsky’s dream of the self-evaluating organiza-
tion (Wildavsky, 1972). As expressed by one of our respondents, “we 
should not become too dependent on them [i.e., external evaluators]” 
(DEPT2). Time should reveal whether we will indeed see a develop-
ment toward more internal evaluations in the long run in Flanders, 
in line with the global trend (Sonnichsen, 2000; Mathison, 2011).
This article has been restricted to an identification of individual con-
ditions that appear most decisive in distinguishing most-similar or-
ganizations with different outcomes and most-different organizations 
with similar outcomes. The MSDO/MDSO technique is often used 
before moving to a combinatory analysis of conditions. A qualitative 
comparative analysis (Ragin, 1987, 2000) with these conditions as 
input would be a logical avenue for further research. Future studies 
should also test the extent of external validity of our findings. Are our 
results unique to a region that has only recently started to develop an 
evaluation culture, or can we claim wider generalizability?
NOTES
1 As an assisting tool, we relied on the MSDO/MDSO software (beta-
version 8/7/2006), developed by G. De Meur (available at http://www.
jchr.be/01/beta.htm).
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2 Within the scope of this article, we list only the results of the MSDO/
MDSO analyses. The full analyses can be requested via the authors.
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Appendix 1
Overview of Conditions, Their Indicators, and Dichotomization Thresholds
Conditions Code 0 indicators Code 1 indicators
Category A: Capabilities of the organization
(1)  Skills to conduct evaluations Totally insufficient, rather 
insufficient
Rather sufficient, fully 
sufficient(2)  Financial means to evaluate
(3)  Availability of capable staff
(4)  Availability of external evaluators
(5)  Availability of monitoring information
Category B: Orientations
Extent of evaluation demand from: No demand, hardly any 
demand
Sometimes demand, 
frequent demand(6)  Organizational management
(7)  Sector minister
(8)  Parliament
(9)  Civil society organizations
(10) Other organizations
(11) Extent of organization-wide support  
  for evaluations
Not at all, to limited extent To major extent, to large 
extent
Category C: Conditions with regard to the institutional setting
(12) Organizational size Very low, low material 
weight (*)
At least average material 
weight
(13) Organizational autonomy No legal personality Legal personality
(14) Organizational status Agency Department
(15) Anchorage of evaluation function No evaluation unit Formal or de facto  
evaluation unit
(16) Participation in evaluation  
  community
No engagement in evalua-
tion trainings or networks
Minimally “sometimes” 
participating in evaluation 
trainings or networks
Evaluation requirements stipulated in: No evaluation requirements Evaluation requirements
(17) regulation or decrees at Flemish level
(18) legislation/regulation at EU level
(19) management agreement of  
  organization
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Conditions Code 0 indicators Code 1 indicators
Category D: Conditions concerning policy issue characteristics
(20) Attention by media or parliament for  
  the tasks of the organization
Not at all, limited, rather 
limited
Rather much, much, very 
much
Highest score of the assessments of attention by 
each of these ‘institutions”
(21) Perceived competition on tasks of the  
  organization
Not at all, limited, rather 
limited
Rather much, much, very 
much
(22) Perceived measurability of outputs and Average score ≤ 3 and/or 
qualification: very difficult, 
difficult, rather difficult
Average score ≥ 3 and/
or qualification very easy, 
rather easy, easy(23) outcomes
Average score of measurability on a scale of 
1 (very difficult to measure) to 5 (very easy to 
measure) of the three most important outputs and 
outcomes of the organization
Category E: Conditions characterizing the path of the organization
(24) Pre-NPM evaluation experience No/seldom evaluation 
practice before the BAP 
reforms
Sometimes/frequent evalu-
ation practice before the 
BAP reforms
(25) Organizational stability Organizations which 
underwent medium or large 
changes (**)
Organizations which 
underwent no or small 
changes
(26) Ministerial stability ≥ 1 minister changes since 
BAP
No ministerial turnover
(*) The indicator concerns both financial material weight (50%) and material weight with regard to personnel 
(50%). For financial material weight, the following scales are used [in 10,000 EUR]: (1) very low material 
weight: 0–50,000; (2) low material weight: 10,000–50,000; (3) average material weight: 50,000–100,000; (4) 
high material weight: 100,000–500,000; (5) very high material weight: < 500,000. As for material weight with 
regard to personnel, in staff numbers per organization: (1) very low: 0–100; (2) low: 101–200; (3) average: 
201–400; (4) high: 401–900; (5) very high: > 900. We calculated the average for the years 2007–2008–2009 
(IAVA, 2007, 2008, 2009).
(**) Four subcriteria constitute this indicator. Three of them relate to the impact of the NPM-oriented reforms 
(which account for 60% of the total indicator): (a) changes in the form of management/steering of the 
organization; (b) changes with regard to the composition of the public entity; (c) changes with regard to the 
organization of the management support services. The remaining 40% of the indicator refers to changes 
independent of the NPM reforms. Based on the sum of these subcriteria, a scale can be composed ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.5, with 0.5 standing for those organizations that underwent a large number of changes; 0.3 for 
those that underwent a medium number of changes; and 0.1. for those organizations that can be characterized 
by large stability. We calculated the average for the years 2007–2008–2009 (IAVA, 2007, 2008, 2009).
62 The Canadian Journal of Program evaluaTion
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 2
Bi
na
ry
 D
at
a 
Ta
bl
e
Ca
teg
or
y A
:
Ac
to
r c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s
Ca
teg
or
y B
:
Ac
to
r o
rie
nt
ati
on
s
Ca
teg
or
y C
: 
In
sti
tu
tio
na
l s
ett
in
g
Ca
teg
or
y D
: 
Po
lic
y i
ss
ue
 
ch
ar
ac
ter
-
ist
ics
Ca
teg
or
y E
:
Pa
th
 o
f
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
Ca
se
 (*
)
Skills to conduct evaluations
Financial means to evaluate
Availabilty of capable staff
Availability of external evalutors
Availabiliity of monitoring info
Evaluation demand from management
Evaluation demand from minister
Evaluation demand from Parliament
Evaluation demand from civil society organizations
Evaluation demand from other organizations
Organization-wide support for evaluations
Organizational size
Organizational autonomy
Organizational status
Anchorage of evaluation function
Participation in evaluation community
Evaluation requirements in management agreement
Evaluation requirement in Flemish legislation
EU international evaluation requirements
Media/parliamentary attention for organization
Competition
Measurability of outputs
Measurability of outcomes
pre-NPM evaluation experience
Organizational stability
Ministerial stability
Ca
se
s w
ith
  
ten
de
nc
y t
o 
co
nd
uc
t i
nt
er
na
l 
ev
alu
ati
on
s
IN
TA
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
DE
PT
7
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
IN
TA
LP
3
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
IN
TA
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
ILT
AL
P1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
EX
TA
6
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
IN
TA
5
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
63La Revue canadienne d’évaLuation de pRogRamme
DE
PT
3
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
EX
TA
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
EX
TA
3
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
DE
PT
11
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
Ca
se
s t
ha
t 
ou
tso
ur
ce
 m
os
t 
ev
alu
ati
on
s
ILT
AL
P2
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
EX
TA
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
DE
PT
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
DE
PT
5
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
DE
PT
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
DE
PT
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
DE
PT
6
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
(*
) C
as
e c
od
es
 ar
e c
om
po
se
d 
of
 a 
let
ter
 co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
an
d 
a n
um
be
r. 
DE
PT
 st
an
ds
 fo
r d
ep
ar
tm
en
t; 
EX
TA
 fo
r e
xte
rn
al 
ag
en
cie
s o
f p
ub
lic
 n
atu
re
; I
NT
A 
fo
r i
nt
er
na
l a
ge
nc
ies
 
wi
th
ou
t l
eg
al 
pe
rs
on
ali
ty;
 IN
TA
LP
 fo
r i
nt
er
na
l a
ge
nc
ies
 w
ith
 le
ga
l p
er
so
na
lit
y. 
Th
e n
um
be
rs
 ar
e c
ho
se
n 
at 
ra
nd
om
.
